In this paper we construct a strong randomness extractor with two independent ℓ-bit input distributions with min entropies b X , b Y , b X + b Y > ℓ (the probability of any particular output is upper bounded by 2 −b X and 2
a b s t r a c t
In this paper we construct a strong randomness extractor with two independent ℓ-bit produces one bit which is by the factor of √ 2 closer to the uniform distribution, when compared to the Hadamard extractor. What is more, this distance drops to zero if at least one of the min entropies raises to ℓ. This is in sharp contrast to the Hadamard extractor which fails to produce even a single unbiased bit, even if one of the input distributions is uniform. We also extend our construction to produce k bits of output with a bias that is by the factor of
Introduction
True randomness is a valuable resource. Many tasks in cryptography and computation in general require uniform random sources to work properly. In spite of extensive research scientists have been unsuccessful in building a device that produces true randomness out of first principles and is fully independent of outside environment. This is the main reason why a long line of research has been devoted to design efficient procedures to transform ''weak sources of randomness'', which do occur in nature, into random sources that are close to uniform.
The first idea of a randomness extractor is due to von Neumann [32] , who showed how to produce unbiased bits from a string of independent coin tosses with unknown fixed bias. Later Blum [5] considered sources generated by finite-state Markov chains. Santha and Vazirani [26] , Vazirani [30] , Dodis et al. [11] , Barak et al. [2] , Barak et al. [1] , Raz [25] , Rao [22] , Bourgain [6] , Shaltiel [27] , Li [19] and Barak et al. [3] considered extraction methods from several independent sources that contain ''enough randomness''. Chor et al. [9] , Ben-or and Linial [4] , Cohen and Wigderson [10] , Kamp and Zuckerman [18] and Gabizon et al. [13] studied sources, which are uniform on a subset of bits. Later these sources were generalized to so called affine sources, which were studied by Rao [24] , Gabizon and Raz [15] , Barak et al. [1] , Bourgain [7] , Yehudayoff [33] and Li [20] . Trevisan and Vadhan [29] and Kamp et al. [17] found extractors for efficiently samplable distributions and Viola [31] considered extractors for circuit sources.
In our work we will consider (ℓ, b)-sources, i.e. sources that output bit strings of length ℓ and the probability of any particular string is upper bounded by 2 −b . Such sources have been introduced in [8] and are widely considered in the literature. Our method will be used to extract randomness from two independent sources X , Y of the same length with min entropies b X , b Y , respectively.
row and column of such a matrix is labeled by a string of length ℓ. [26, 8, 11] have shown that the dot product function x · y =  i x i · y i  mod 2 is a good one-bit extractor for two independent sources. The matrix representation of the dot product modulo 2 is a Hadamard matrix, and thus this function is often referred to as a Hadamard extractor. A Hadamard matrix is a matrix such that each two rows (columns) are mutually orthogonal, and it can be shown that the sum of elements of each minor is relatively small. The disadvantage of Hadamard matrices is that the amount of elements 1 is not equal to the amount of elements −1 in the matrix and it turns out that this property introduces unnecessary bias to the output distribution, especially for high min entropies (representing high quality sources of randomness). The Hadamard extractor and its extension to multiple bit output are used in more sophisticated constructions that combine different kinds of extractors to achieve better parameters (see for example [1, 14] ). What is more, as shown in [23] , the celebrated extractor of Bourgain [6] can be viewed as a two step procedure: firstly encoding the input distributions in order to raise the min-entropy of their sumset, and subsequently using the Hadamard extractor to obtain bits that are close to uniform.
Our work is a direct continuation of the line of works [26, 8, 11] . We design a two source extractor for one bit which performs better than the Hadamard extractor considering the bias of the output bit from a uniform distribution, preserving its strongness property. This is achieved by modifying the function x·y = (  i x i ·y i ) mod 2 so that it sums the first bits x 1 and y 1 instead of multiplying them. Using the XOR lemma, we show how the suggested extractor can be utilized to construct a two source extractor with a k bit output. This construction decreases the distance of the output bits from the uniform distribution compared to the Hadamard construction and still preserves the strongness property of the original extractor, however with a bias increased by a constant factor. Apart from the better quality of the output, its main advantage is the simplicity of its construction. Our extractor can fully substitute the Hadamard extractor in the constructions that are not based on its strongness property, including Bourgain's extractor. For (ℓ, b)-sources with b ≤ ℓ − 1 we obtain at least a
smaller bias than the k bit Hadamard extractor analyzed in [11] . Moreover, the bias approaches zero as one of the min entropies approached ℓ.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce necessary notation and preliminary lemmas. In Section 3 we design a one-bit extractor with two input sources X , Y and an output distribution over {0, 1}. In Section 4, we extend our construction for more output bits.
Preliminaries

Notation
Various models of non-uniform sources have been proposed in the literature so far. Throughout the paper we will use the model proposed by Chor and Goldreich [8] , which characterizes a random source X over {0, 1}
ℓ via its min-entropy H ∞ : 
Let U ℓ be a uniformly distributed random variable over {0,
Chor and Goldreich [8] showed that to analyze the bias of the output distribution of a function F , we need to consider only flat distributions, since the worst case behavior of functions is obtained by them.
Extractors
Let us define a few primitives used in extracting randomness from non-uniform sources. We begin with a definition of a (seeded) extractor (see for example [21, 28] ):
Seeded extractors require few uniformly distributed bits as an input (the so-called seed). A typical way to overcome the need for unbiased bits is to consider two source extractors [8, 11, 22, 25] . We restrict ourselves to extractors for two sources of the same length ℓ:
A strong two source extractor, as opposed to a simple extractor, has an additional requirement. Its output has to be close to uniform even if conditioned on either one of the inputs.
where (A, B) denotes the joint distribution of A and B.
According to these definitions, the quality of an extractor is determined by its worst case behavior, i. e., the quality of its output with the worst possible inputs. This can be viewed as a game, where an adversary (knowing all details about the extractor in use) can choose specific sources satisfying the min-entropy bound to achieve the largest error of the output. To compare the quality of two extractors, one has to compare their outputs for their respective worst-case inputs, which might be different for different extractors.
Extractors as Boolean functions
Two source extractors with output distribution over {0, 1} can be viewed as Boolean functions. For each Boolean function
x,y=0 , with each row labeled by binary representation of x and each column labeled by binary representation of y. Let us define the element m x,y as ( −1) F (x,y) . To use F as a two source extractor, a row is chosen according to the distribution X and a column according to the distribution Y . The output bit is determined by the corresponding matrix element.
We are going to derive two lemmas that show the correspondence between the absolute value of the sum of minor elements of a function represented by a matrix and the bias of an output distribution.
Lemma 1. Suppose F is represented by M F
As we are choosing from both S X and S Y uniformly, each element m x,y of such a minor has the same probability
to be produced. Without loss of generality let us assume that at least half of the elements of the minor specified by S X and S Y equal 1 (the sum is non-negative). Utilizing the condition |  x∈S X ,y∈S Y m x,y | ≤ N, the probability that the function outputs 0 is bounded by Then the probability that F will output 0, given the column y was chosen, is 1 2
Plugging the sum into (2) and using the assumption of the lemma we get: 
Hadamard matrix
where
is obtained from higher-rank tensor by flattening. Let x = (x 1 , . . . 
By Lindsay's lemma and Lemma 1, the dot product modulo 2 is a (
) two source extractor with one bit output. Dodis and Oliveira [12] presented a stronger form of Lindsay's lemma, which allows to study the strongness property of extractors by matrix representations: 
By Lemmas 4 and 2, the dot product modulo 2 is a (
) strong two source extractor with one bit output.
The use of the first bit
In order to improve the performance of the Hadamard extractor, we are going to analyze functions on a string of bits that are equal to the scalar product up to the operation ⊙ : {0, 1} 2 → {0, 1} on bits x 1 and y 1 , i.e. functions of the form:
Our aim is to optimize ⊙ for the extraction quality. Let M ⊙ be a 2 × 2 matrix with rows and columns labeled by {0, −1
x,y=0 has the form
Let us denote It is easy to see that F ⊙ ≤ S ⊙ . The block form of M F ⊙ will consist of four Hadamard matrices, each of them being either H ℓ−1 or −H ℓ−1 . With this knowledge we will be able to use Lindsay's lemma and its stronger form to find upper bounds on F ⊙ and S ⊙ . In the rest of this section we perform an analysis for different cases of function ⊙.
Notice that each row (column) of the matrix M F ⊙ is orthogonal to every other row (column), i. e., it is a Hadamard matrix and Lindsay's lemma and Lemma 4 apply. Thus in this case
Operation ⊙ is constant
That is M F ⊙ has one of two possible block representations:
Since the block representation of M F ⊙ consists of four identical Hadamard matrices, it is easy to see that
Operation ⊙ is balanced and has a diagonal form M F ⊙ has one of the following forms:
Without loss of generality, let us consider the first one of them. The choice of the rows S X can contain rows of two types. We obtained that the worst-case selection of s x rows (regardless of the column selection) in the original matrix is not worse than selection of s x rows in the matrix 
For s x , s y > 2 ℓ−1 , S X and S Y have to contain a growing fraction of rows and columns with opposite signs and the value of the upper bound drops accordingly, i.e.
This bound reaches 0 if at least one of s x , s y reaches 2 ℓ . In conclusion, by Lemma 1, 
Notice that this is the same value as for the Hadamard extractor. Interestingly, the strategy which maximizes the bias in the strong extraction scenario leads to vanishing of the bias in usual extraction scenario (i.e. the output distribution is completely uniform, but is not fully independent of one of the input sources). This is in a sharp contrast to the standard Hadamard extraction, where the same strategy maximizes both the bias of the output distribution and the correlation to one of the input distributions.
Operation ⊙ is balanced and has a horizontal or vertical form
The rest of the functions are of the form:
Due to symmetry it suffices to analyze x 1 ⊙ y 1 = x 1 . Notice that just like in the previous case, the bottom half of the rows is equal to the top half up to the sign and it does not help to select the opposite rows. As for the choice of columns, we have to maximize over two equal Hadamard submatrices H ℓ−1 . Thus, we can argue similarly to the previous cases and conclude that for s x ≤ 2 ℓ−1 ,
On the other hand, for s x > 2 ℓ−1 , S X has to contain some rows with opposite signs, thus
With the use of Lemma 1, we can conclude that
) two source extractor. Notice that this is the same result as for the Hadamard extractor and the bias reaches zero as b X reaches ℓ.
It remains to analyze strongness of extraction of this function. Similarly to the previous case, the optimal strategy chooses rows with opposite signs and high absolute values. Due to the block form of the matrix, the choice of columns has to be optimized over two identical Hadamard matrices of size 2
By Lemma 2, we can conclude that
)-strong two source extractor. Similarly to the previous case, the strategies for maximizing the bias of the output distribution and the correlation to one of the input distributions are different. If the correlation is maximized, the output distribution is completely uniform and if the bias is optimized, the correlation vanishes.
Conclusion of the analysis
In this section we have explicitly constructed a two source extractor with a single bit output 
Extracting multiple bits
Let A = {A 1 , . . . , A k } be a set of ℓ × ℓ matrices with elements from {0, 1} such that for each nonempty subset S ⊆ {0, . . . , k}, the rank of A S ≡  i∈S A i (mod 2) is ℓ. Dodis et al. [11] showed that such sets of matrices exist for all k ≤ ℓ. Using such set of matrices, they proposed the following extractor:
where all the operations are taken modulo 2. The proof that the output distribution is close to the uniform is based on XOR lemma (see for example [16] ):
If X outputs a string x ∈ {0, 1} k , X · a outputs the parity of those bits in the string x defined by the positions of ones in a. EXT A (X, Y ) · a takes values in {0, 1} and depends on both input distributions X and Y . As we have shown before, such random variables can be represented by a matrix with elements ±1. Dodis et al. [11] showed that for every a the matrix representation M a of a random variable EXT A (X, Y ) · a corresponds to a Hadamard matrix if {A 1 , . . . , A k } is a set of matrices with desired properties. Denote i ∈ a iff a ∈ {0, 1} k has 1 in the ith position. Let A a = (  i∈a A i ) mod 2. The crucial observation is the following:
where all the operations are taken modulo 2. As  i∈a A i has full rank, it represents a bijective function on all x ∈ {0, 1} ℓ .
Thus M a is equal to H ℓ (given by the construction introduced in Section 1) up to a permutation of rows, which does not change the Hadamard property. This allows to upper bound each summand of the XOR lemma to show that EXT A is a
)-strong two source extractor.
Let us now consider
Theorem 1. The function
where all the operations are modulo 2, is a
) two source extractor of k bits.
Proof. To show this we adopt the proof of Dodis et al. [11] . First let us consider only sources with min entropy b X , b Y ≤ ℓ−1.
We get
The key difference is that the operation F + is distributive with respect to matrix operation only for an odd number of summands. Let us split the sum into two parts based on the parity of the vector a. For odd parities we get:
By the previous analysis (see Eq. (4)), the upper bound on the distance from the uniform distribution for odd parities is
. Similarly, for even parities we get:
By the previous analysis (see Eq. (6)), the upper bound on the distance from the uniform distribution for even parities is 2
. Finally, by the XOR lemma:
This brings us to the final result
We have shown that
) two source extractor. What is more, for min entropies b X , b Y > ℓ−1 the bias decreases, as discussed in Section 3, namely as b X reaches ℓ, the bias of both odd and even parities drops to zero, thus the bias of the output drops to zero. If b Y drops to zero, the bias of odd parities drops to zero and the resulting bias reaches half of the Hadamard bias.
We can use similar arguments in the case of the strong extraction scenario. According to Section 3, odd parities achieve the same bound as the Hadamard extractor and even parities achieve a √ 2 bigger bound. Thus, the extractor retains the strongness property, but the price to pay for decreasing the bias in the non-strong extraction scenario is the increase of the bias by the factor of  3 2 in the strong extraction scenario.
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented an extractor for two ℓ-bit input distributions X , Y with min-entropies b X , b Y , b X +b Y > ℓ.
If this extractor is used to extract one bit of information, the quality of the output distribution is by the factor √ 2 2 better than that of the Hadamard extractor. The strongness of the extractor remains the same as for the Hadamard extractor, thus, our extractor can outperform the Hadamard one in all applications where it is used.
Using the Hadamard extractor, if one or even both of the input sequences are uniform, the output sequence is still biased by a constant factor. This is due to the fact that the Hadamard matrix has a different number of entries 1 and −1. On the contrary, by reestablishing the balance of the different entries, our extractor achieves uniform distribution on the output bit in case when at least one of the input distributions is uniform. Moreover, if one of the distributions is almost uniform (e.g. l − b << 1), the output distribution is far better than that produced by the Hadamard extractor, especially for small l. With this property the extractor is applicable especially in scenarios where one of the sources is expected to be (almost) uniform, but for security reasons is combined with a different (perhaps weaker, but independent) source.
Our extractor can be also used to extract 1 < k ≤ ℓ bits. The bias of the produced sequence of bits is by the factor scenario where we expect one distribution to be (almost) uniform, using our extractor can substantially improve the quality of the extraction, as compared to the Hadamard one. The strongness of the extractor is maintained in this scenario as well, however the price to pay is the increase of the upper bound on the bias by the factor of  3 2 , compared to the Hadamard extractor.
